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Abstract
Mobile nodes, in particular smartphones are one of the
most relevant devices in the current Internet in terms of
quantity and economic impact. There is the common be-
lieve that those devices are of special interest for attack-
ers due to their limited resources and the serious data
they store. On the other hand, the mobile regime is a
very lively network environment, which misses the (lim-
ited) ground truth we have in commonly connected Inter-
net nodes. In this paper we argue for a simple long-term
measurement infrastructure that allows for (1) the analy-
sis of unsolicited traffic to and from mobile devices and
(2) fair comparison with wired Internet access. We in-
troduce the design and implementation of a mobile hon-
eypot, which is deployed on standard hardware for more
than 1.5 years. Two independent groups developed the
same concept for the system. We also present prelimi-
nary measurement results.
1 Introduction
Scanning Internet hosts to initiate a denial of service, to
find an exploit, or to discover an unsecured remote access
is typically the first step of an attack towards Internet de-
vices. In former times those attacks have been reserved
to traditional server systems [1]. Today, not only desk-
tops but also mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) offer in-
tentionally external services.
Mobile phones are particularly threaten by attacks.
They are almost always connected with the Internet.
Their limited resources do not allow the application of
commonly used security mechanisms. In addition, many
end users disable security barriers, which have been in-
troduced by vendors, when they root or jailbreak their
mobile [2]. From this perspective it is reasonably to as-
sume that attackers specifically target on mobile devices.
A plethora of research discussed network-based vulner-
ability of mobiles and proposed solutions (e.g., [3]), but
up until now unsolicited remote accesses to mobiles have
not been studied in detail. In this paper, we argue that
a measurement infrastructure is required which aims to
quantify and to analyse the amount of remote attacks on
mobiles.
A common technique to study attack behavior is the
deployment of honeypot. A honeypot is a trap for col-
lecting data from unauthorized system access—in this
analysis via IP—initiated by remote parties. However,
the term “mobile honeypot” is not well-defined and there
is only very limited work on the design of a measurement
system that allows for both, the analysis of the mobile as
well as non-mobile world. In this paper we extend our
previous work [4] and make the following core contribu-
tions:
1. We introduce the detailed design and implementa-
tion concepts of a mobile honeypot. The principles
of the system have been developed independently
by two groups. It has been running for approxi-
mately 1.5 years and is part of the early warning sys-
tem of one of the largest ISPs in Europe. The hon-
eypot system abstracts from unnecessary mobile as-
pects, which allows us to deploy the same software
base on standard PCs that are connected to different
types of Internet access.
2. We report on preliminary measurement results. This
includes a summary of our current observations of
attack behaviour on smartphones, as well as a sta-
tistical analysis of unsolicited traffic [5]. The traffic
measurement presents data from November 2012,
which we compare with common wired Internet ac-
cess and with our results from January 2012 [4].
Surprisingly, we do not find a significant amount
of attacks specific to mobiles, which indicates that
adversaries operate almost independently of the ac-
tually captured host.
The vulnerability of smartphones is based on multi-
ple aspects. This paper concentrates on remote attacks
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via the Internet. One might argue that a mobile opera-
tor usually do not assign public IP addresses to mobiles
and that NAT techniques protect the systems against ma-
licious access. We think the mobile environment needs
an early and continuous analysis as well as appropri-
ate tools. There are still operators providing public IP
addresses. With an increased deployment of IPv6 the
IP address assignment policy will change as several ap-
plication scenarios requiring direct access without NAT
traversal.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce background and discuss related
work in the context of mobile honeypots. We present the
design space, implementation, and deployment aspects
of the mobile honeypot system in Section 3. Our mea-
surement study is discussed in Section 4. We conclude
with an outlook in Section 5.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Trapping Attackers with a Honeypot
In contrast to other security measures that ultimately try
to keep the attacker out of the system, honeypots are
meant to be compromised. Their value lies in luring the
attacker into entering a system and collecting informa-
tion on how this is done.
A honeypot is typically classified as low interaction
or high interaction honeypot and client or server honey-
pot. A low interaction honeypot primarily collects in-
formation about the attacker and detects known attacks.
The limited level of interaction between attacker and tar-
get is achieved by not providing fully functional services
but only emulations thereof with known exploits. On the
other hand, a high interaction honeypot provides a fully
functional system. They are used to reveal current and
new attacks that do not have to be catered for when set-
ting up the honeypot. Since the high-interaction honey-
pot is a fully functional system, it has to be closely mon-
itored for successful attacks to prevent the attacker from
using the honeypot to target other systems on the net-
work. Server honeypots provide vulnerable services to
malicious clients. Their focus is in protocol and service
specific vulnerabilities. A server honeypot does not offer
any legitimate services, any connection by a client can
be treated as an attack. Client honeypots take the role of
a vulnerable client trying to find malicious servers.
2.2 Wireless versus Mobile Honeypots
Physical and virtual honeypots [6] have been studied in
detail, however, there is only little work in the field of
mobile-related honeypots. Mobile honeypots have to be
distinguished from wireless honeypots [7], [8], which
focus on the attacks on the wireless technology. The
term mobile honeypot is used here referring to honey-
pots that focus on attacks on mobile devices.1 They
can either be mobile themselves in running on the mo-
bile device in which case they would usually be low in-
teraction honeypots used for deception and detection of
known attacks. This also greatly reduces the possibil-
ity of the device itself being compromised. On the other
hand they can be dedicated devices up to high interac-
tion solutions set up to expose unknown attacks. Mobile
honeypots in the sense of honeypots focussing on mobile
devices are for example developed by the Chinese Chap-
ter of the Honeynet Project [10]. They are using proto-
type deployments of honeypots for Bluetooth, WiFi, and
MMS. TJ OConnor and Ben Sangster built honeyM [11],
a framework for virtualized mobile device client honey-
pots, which emulates in particular wireless technologies.
Mulliner et al. [12] propose HoneyDroid, a specific mo-
bile honeyot that exclusively runs on smartphones. We
argue that those approaches complicate the measurement
across different types of systems. In addition, they are
only required if the hardware characteristics are relevant
for the study.
3 Mobile Honeypot System
Our primary goal is the design of a measurement sys-
tem that captures traffic characteristics of malicious be-
haviour on mobile devices and allows for comparison
with non-mobile environments. In addition to these sta-
tistical observations, we are interested in the more de-
tailed procedure of potential attackers (e.g., which soft-
ware do they infiltrate). A common technique is the ap-
plication of a honeypot. In this section, we discuss ap-
propriate levels of abstraction to cover the mobile envi-
ronment without losing comparability with non-mobile
setups. The mobile honeypot has been designed and im-
plemented coincidently by two different groups. Both
groups approached completely independently at the same
conclusion.
AttackerModel In this paper, we concentrate on a sys-
tem that analyzes malicious access via the Internet on
smartphones. We argue for a typical attacker model. The
attacker tries to compromise the smartphone via unso-
licited remote connections [3], or captures the mobile us-
ing malware and initiates further denial of service attacks
to other mobiles or non-mobile hosts [13], [14]. In any
case, such remote attacks are bound to the network layer
1Note that the term “mobile honeypot” is also used to describe other
scenarios. Balachander Krishnamurthy [9] uses it to describe prefixes
of darknet address space that (1) are advertised to upstream ASes, mak-
ing the information mobile, and (2) change aperiodically, moving the
darknet in the address space.
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and moreover do not address specifics of mobile hard-
ware, but solely target at the system level. The adversary
actively tries to find vulnerable nodes and may use addi-
tional information such as IP topology data or web server
logs to differentiate mobile and non-mobile networks.
3.1 Design
The term “mobile honeypot” is not well-defined. The
general design space is based on the following three
questions: (Q1) Is it necessary that the probe runs on a
mobile device—if yes which device type (notebook ver-
sus smartphones versus . . . )? (Q2) Is it necessary that
the honeypot runs on a mobile operating system (PC em-
ulation versus mobile device)? (Q3) To which network
is the mobile honeypot connected (DSL network versus
UMTS network versus . . . )?
According to the attacker model, there is no need to
operate the mobile honeypot on real smartphones. This
reduces complexity in building the honeypot and simpli-
fies long-term operation.
As underlying operating system we decided for Linux.
This has two advantages: (1) Most of the currently de-
ployed smartphones use the Android OS. We conducted
fingerprinting tests using the well-known tools Nmap and
Xprobe, which try to guess the operating system. Both
tools cannot distinguish Android from current Linux ver-
sions. (2) Using Linux enables us to re-use existing hon-
eypot tools independently of the deployment in mobile
or non-mobile scenarios. This allows us the ensure com-
parison between different systems.
An important change is the adjustment of the virtual
file system that is presented to the attacker. It should re-
flect the directory structure of a typical Android system.
To increase the attractiveness for an adversary, we ac-
count for “rooted” (or “jailbreaked”) devices. A rooted
device grants additional system access to the user. It
allows post installation of additional services such as
HTTP or file sharing. A honeypot system that intends
to capture tools introduced by the attacker need to emu-
late a rooted smartphone. Note, considering rooted de-
vices provides the attacker with supplementary features
and thus does not exclude off-the-shelf mobiles.
Regarding the third question we argue that the mobile
probe should connect to a real mobile network. Other-
wise, an attacker could detect performance differences
(e.g., network delay) in advance. In addition, a connec-
tion via a real mobile operator ensures the assignment of
a topological correct IP address. Note, for an attacker it
is easy to identify relevant IP blocks, either by testing or
analysing meta data in the Internet registries.
As we are mainly interested in the analysis of statisti-
cal effects and not on dedicated attacks, the mobile hon-
eypot is primarily based on low-interaction honeypots.
3.2 Implementation
Software To implement the proposed honeypot sys-
tem, we use multiple well-known honeypot tools. The
mobile honeypot consists of the following different sub-
honyepots: Kippo, Glastopf, and Dionaea.
Kippo is a dedicated SSH honeypot that emulates re-
mote terminal sessions. Login access is secured by a
trivial password, which allows an attacker to gain eas-
ily access to the system. The user account is granted
administrator privileges. An attacker can execute com-
mon programs, as well as download and install addi-
tional tools. The honeypot records downloaded files in
the background for later analysis. To protect the honey-
pot against compromising operations, all infiltrated ac-
tions are only valid within the current attack session and
the execution of newly installed programs is prohibited.
Note, this does not conflict with our objectives, as we are
interested in the principle behaviour of the attacker.
Glastopf implements a web-based media server pro-
viding an upload form. Uploaded data can be stored in
a simulated smartphone file system. This honeypot emu-
lates typical vulnerabilities of a web system.
Dionaea is used to emulate TFTP and FTP services.
To detect generic attacks, we use Honeytrap. It listens
on all other transport ports and is particularly useful to
analyse statistical effects. Worms, for example, do not
need a protocol compliant negotiation of transmission
parameters but send data via an existing TCP connection
without waiting for corresponding replies.
Network connectivity Several mobile operators pro-
vide only private IP addresses. Nevertheless, there is a
continuous demand for public IP addresses. In partic-
ular with an increased deployment of IPv6, we expect
a significant change, which will enable mobile nodes to
participate in the Internet without NAT traversal.
In addition, many mobile operators, at least in Ger-
many, prevent the communication between end devices
per default in NAT domains. For this reason, the de-
ployed mobile honeypot presented in this paper is con-
nected via the Deutsche Telekom, one of the largest
telecommunications companies in Europe. They allow
to choose an alternative Access Point Name (APN) that
provides public IP addresses and thus intra-domain com-
munication.
Note, the proposed honeypot system can be connected
to any other type of network access, such as a DSL home
network or business Internet access. This allows us to use
the same system in different network environments (i.e.,
wired and wireless infrastructures), and to monitor attack
behaviour from different vantage points in the Internet
without loosing reproducibility.
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Figure 1: Comparing amount of attacks on different between mobile and non-mobile honeypot probes, Nov. 2012
3.3 Deployment
We started the deployment of the honeypot systems at
common PC hardware mid of 2011. Since then they run
continuously and surprisingly well. The mobile honey-
pots of both independent groups include one iOS and
two Android probes. They are connected via an USB
stick to the UMTS network. All data is exported in a five
minute interval to the early warning system of one Euro-
pean’s largest telecommunication companies. To prevent
interference and preserve bandwidth of the UMTS link,
log data is transmitted using a separate LAN connection.
Data from or to the log server is excluded from further
analysis.
In addition to the measurement probes that use a mo-
bile Internet access, we deployed the same system at
three nodes connected to different non-mobile networks.
In detail, the network access is (1) a university network,
which reflects a stable and well-known open access; (2)
a DSL network, which represents a common home up-
link; (3) a darknet, which highlights background noise,
because it does not announce any service. These charac-
teristic access types allow for comparison of the mobile
measurements with non-mobile environments.
4 Measurement Study
In this section, we present preliminary measurement re-
sults of the mobile honeypot system. We could not find
substantial disagreements between the different mobile
probes. We count any external connect to the honeypot
system as an attack, its source IP address is called the
attacker.
4.1 General Observations
In general, the number of attacks targeting the mobile
probe do not significantly differ from honeypots con-
nected to the Internet via typical wired access. It seems
that the attackers scan the Internet without considering
specific network types but try to exploit as many devices
as possible.
The procedure of the attacker is almost identical to the
wired probes. After gaining successfully a shell login
and executing some common commands, an adversary
usually downloads malicious software and tries to inte-
grate the honeypot into an IRC-botnet. The attacker ini-
tiates commands almost independently of the local sys-
tem properties even if this leads to conflicts (e.g., non-
existing directories). We frequently observed that the ad-
versary navigates through the file system directories fol-
lowing the common Linux structure. Specific Android
processes have been ignored.
To our surprise, we observed very rarely an intruder
that conducted a mobile-specific attack. For example, af-
ter establishing an SSH connection to the mobile honey-
pot, one adversary targeted on the address book as well as
the stored photos of the emulated mobile system. Those
attacks are usually performed manually and not based on
scripts. However, the mobile honeypot did not captured
Android- or iOS-specific malware or Exploits.
4.2 Comparative Detail Analysis
For our subsequent analysis we focus on network traffic
and compare effects on the mobile honeypot with non-
mobile systems. We consider the measurement period of
November 2012.
Most of the external requests are related to the univer-
sity network (cf., Table 1). The DSL and UMTS hon-
eypots measure on average 21 and 55 attacks per hour,
respectively. More surprisingly, the darknet experiences
on average about 83 external requests. Around 90% of
the attacks use TCP. The prominent ports are 22 (SSH),
1433/3306 (MSSQL), and 80 (HTTP). We summarize
details in Table 2.
4.2.1 Attacks per AS
To explore the topological location of the attacks, we
map the source IP addresses of the adversaries to their
origin autonomous system (AS) using the common IP to
ASN lookup service provided by Team Cymru. We rank
each AS separately per network access.
Overall, most of the attacks are initiated from IP pre-
fixes that belong to the same small set of ASes (cf., Fig-
ure 2(a)). The top-5 ASes are primarily based in China
and Russia and do not cover mobile operators. The distri-
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# Attacked ports per transport protocol # Attacks per transport protocol
UMTS Darknet DSL University UMTS Darknet DSL University
TCP 111 133 89 252 14,954 55,378 32,781 22,445,580
UDP 76 71 96 22 637 5,583 8,254 480
Table 1: Amount of malicious requests per transport protocol, November 2012
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
UMTS 22 1433 3306 5900 6666 3389 1080 23 5060 80SSH MSSQL MSSQL VNC RDP SOCKS Telnet SIP HTTP
Darknet 22 139 110 25 3306 91 5901 5900 3389 53SSH NetBIOS POP3 SMTP MSSQL VNC RDP DNS
DSL 51099 22 5900 110 25 3389 143 6666 1433 23SSH VNC POP3 SMTP RDP IMAP MSSQL Telnet
Univ. 445 139 80 22 110 3389 5900 3306 143 5902
MS AD NetBIOS HTTP SSH POP3 RDP VNC MSSQL IMAP
Table 2: Top-10 of the most attacked ports (single events emphasized), November 2012
bution of attacks is enhanced for the university network.
The darknet and the DSL home network follow a simi-
lar shape, in which the mobile network exhibits a more
narrowed distribution. For all network types, it is clearly
visible that already a small number of ASes have a sig-
nificant impact on the attack experiences.
4.2.2 Attackers per AS
In our second statistical analysis, we measure the number
of different source IP addresses (i.e., attackers) per AS
(cf., Figure 2(b)). Again, we calculate the rank separately
for each network access type. This analysis allows us
to estimate the amount of different attack sources and
to balance the intensity of each attacker. Consequently,
the maximal values are three to two orders of magnitude
less compared to the number of attacks. Nevertheless,
the characteristic shape of the curves in Figure 2(a) still
exists.
4.2.3 Comparison with Previous Measurements
In our previous measurements from January 2012 [4] we
found similar results. The most significant difference is
the absolute number of attacks on the mobile system and
the darknet. In November 2012 the darknet experienced
a surprisingly high amount of attacks, indicating that it
is more attractive to an attacker compared to the UMTS
and home network. This is in general not true as the IP
address space of the darknet is officially not related to
any external network service. Looking into this in more
detail reveals that a small set of nodes connected to the
darknet initiating a large portion of requests. This obser-
vation is also highlighted by our analysis per attacker.
Similar to this, the UMTS network is not spared by at-
tacks in general. In January 2012, the UTMS nodes suf-
fered on average on the same amount of requests com-
pared to the home network. Interestingly regions and
originators of attacks were better pronounced and oper-
ate at higher intensity in the beginning of this year. We
consider this as an indicator for the liveliness of the mo-
bile regime, which needs further analysis in the future.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we presented a mobile honeypot system that
allows for a detailed analysis of mobile-specific attacks.
A key insight is the abstraction from unnecessary mobil-
ity aspects. To study common attacks, the honeypot is
neither required to run on a real smartphone, nor on a
full-fledged mobile operating system. The mobile hon-
eypot is operated on standard PCs running Linux. This
enables the analysis of malicious traffic across different
network environments and bears the advantage of sim-
plified long-term maintenance as the same tool basis can
be re-used.
We deployed our concept on probes connected to a
mobile network, as well as monitoring nodes connected
to different types of wired Internet access (i.e., university
network, darknet, DSL home network). So far we did
not find a relevant ratio of remote attacks that specifically
target on the mobile system, neither from non-mobile nor
mobile networks. From this perspective we conclude that
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Figure 2: Comparison of requests per autonomous system separately ranked by network access, Nov. 2012
mobile devices are currently more threatened with mali-
cious applications (e.g., trojan horse) compared to exter-
nal, unsolicited requests via the Internet.
In the future we will still maintain our honeypot setup.
We will concentrate on more subtle correlation analy-
sis of how specific groups of attackers behave with the
aim to identify individual patterns of mobility related ag-
gressions. We will also analyse attacks per port in more
detail, and conduct time series analysis. Due to lim-
ited statistics, though, these considerations will require
a much longer range of observation. Estimating the error
of IP spoofing events on our results is also part of our
future work.
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